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Abstract:  
Apart from pluralism as a common political good or minimum shared agreement, recognition of 
differences needs to be reckoned with.  Concepts of nationalism and liberalism have not fully developed to 
consider each individual as unit. Further, the community should be treated as unit of analysis rather that of 
individual as unit. Muslims in multicultural Indian society should be treated as community as such. Recognition 
is important within the multiplex of differences. Muslims in India is not only a minority, but most importantly 
religious minority in the faces of Hindu nationalism. They are congeneric in nature, but in few cases they are 
frustrated and distinctive ethnicity has cropped up among them. 
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Most liberal philosophers, among them Dworkin, Ackerman, Galston, Rawls, Macedo, and Audi, 
„believe that... values of freedom, equality and toleration are best preserved if religion is removed from public 
affairs.‟ They are virtually unanimous in their staunch advocacy of the „wall of separation.‟ They believe that 
„both religious practice and pluralistic democracy are best preserved‟ by precluding religious argumentation 
within the public realm (Thiemann 1996: 74) and by putting „the moral ideals that divide us off the 
conversational agenda of the liberal state‟ (Ackerman 1989: 16). Chantal Mouffe's attempt to move away from 
the Rawlsian position of holding on to the idea of an original rational agreement and to ground „democracy‟ in a 
permanent state of disputation (since there cannot any longer be a „single idea of a substantial common good‟), 
is instructive in this regard. Pluralism here is seen as possible on condition that the political is defined around a 
minimum shared agreement; that „the principles of the liberal-democratic regime qua political association: 
equality and liberty‟ be defined as the „common political good‟. As Mouffe clarifies that „a liberal-democratic 
regime, if it must be agnostic in terms of morality and religion, cannot be agnostic concerning political values 
since by definition it asserts the principles that constitute its specificity qua political association, i. e., the 
political principles of equality and liberty.‟ (Mouffe 1990: 223). 
Sometimes, it is argued that the Muslims reassert themselves as religious fundamentalist is untenable. 
They are rituals-based and religion-loved people that does not mean fundamentalist in liberal political views. 
State neutrality in western liberal agenda is not admissible. Recognition of differences needs to be reckoned 
with.  Concepts of nationalism and liberalism have not fully developed to consider each individual as unit. Take 
the Indian case.  
The historiography of Indian nationalism has for a long time been dominated by elitism – 
colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism… Both these varieties of elitism share the 
prejudice that the making of the Indian nation and the development of the consciousness – 
nationalism – which informed this process were exclusively or predominantly elite achievements. 
(Guha and Spivak 1988: 37).   
The ideological orientation of the Indian nation state is essentially rested on a monolithic conception of 
sovereignty borrowed from the material world of Western Europe denying multiple identities and several-
layered sovereignties (Jalal 1995). Individuals should be referred as members of a community or communities. 
What are needed are communitarian morality, a morality for equality, fairness, liberty, and legitimacy. It pointed 
to a social basis that avoided an appeal to so-called natural rights without, however, ignoring liberal concerns 
about individual rights. Here, community actually involves  
…an agreement to redistribute the resources of the members in accordance with some shared 
understanding of their needs, subject to on-going political determination in detail. The contract is 
a moral bond. It connects the strong and the weak, the lucky and the unlucky, the rich and the 
poor, creating a union that transcends all differences of interest. (Walzer 1983: 82).  
It is not surprising to find Indian Muslims combining Indian and Islamic traditions. It is proposed that 
the type of ethnicity represented by the Indian Muslims be called „congeneric ethnicity emphasising the form‟s 
similarity to racial and national ethnicity while simultaneously suggesting its differences.‟ (Mines 1975: 404). 
They opt for both Hinduization first and then Islamization. The Muslims in India form a separate ethnic and 
religious identity.  It is an ethnic community which (i) is largely biologically self-perpetuating, (ii) shares 
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fundamental cultural values, (iii) makes up a field of communication and interaction, and (iv) has a membership 
which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other 
categories of the same order. (Barth I969: 10-11). Why? It can be called because of „modernity of tradition‟ or 
„traditionalization of modernity‟. That is why „congeneric ethnicity‟ has cropped up in Indian tradition, 
particularly in case of the Muslims in India. They are most tradition-strewed.  
In general terms congeneric ethnicity occurs in India because of the particular nature of its social 
structure. Caste and religious community form an important aspect of individual identity. A 
person is always the member of a particular group. In the village this is a corporate jati or caste-
like group. In the modern Indian city this corporateness is lost, but the caste appellation or general 
community identity is retained as in the case of the Muslim Tamils. (Mines 1975: 418).  
The Muslims in India are more theologically fatalistic than the majority Hindus, who are more 
empirically fatalistic than the others. This type of fatalism depends upon the social positions of the minority 
communities. Theological fatalism appears to be affected by both doctrine and social position. Empirical 
fatalism seems to be affected by doctrine rather than by social position. (Elder 1966). The Muslims in India can 
be termed as religious community or communities. They are socially stratified as the Hindus, like Saikhs, 
Sayyad, Ali, Mallick, Mondal etc; but there is a difference.  
The Muslim lack of an ideology of purity and pollution has two major implications: a) There is no 
integrating ideology for caste ranking; Muslims do not espouse an overriding ideology 
rationalizing social ranking. b) Mobility is more readily accepted among Muslims than it is among 
Hindus. Social intercourse is freer and more open among the former than it is among the latter. An 
impressive example of this is seen in the Muslims‟ readier approval of intergroup marriages and 
their acceptance of the offspring of such unions. (Mines 1972: 339). 
The social ideology of Islam is essentially egalitarian in nature that upholds equality and fraternity. The 
early Muslim community was inspired by this ideology marked by simplicity and egalitarianism. Later on, in the 
course of time, contact with people like Iranians and Spaniards who already had well-defined systems of 
hierarchy, led to the emergence of stratification in Muslim society (Ahsan 1960). Mandelbaum (1972) points out 
that despite doctrinal equality of all Muslims, the actual social practice of Muslims in all regions of India 
parallels that of their Hindu neighbours, refers to the categories of Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal, inter se hierarchical 
ranking of endogamous hereditary groups and dwells on the disabilities of Arzal, the “untouchables”. He 
concludes that it is not misleading to speak of Muslim jatis. At the same time, he points to certain redeeming 
features, like inter-dining of all groups and worship by all in the same mosque with the exception of the Arzal, 
and the absence of theoretical justification for this unequal hierarchy. However, Sufism was born as a protest 
movement against this deviation from the original Islamic social ideology of egalitarianism and simplicity. 
Ranjit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1988) specifically point out the elitist view of Indian 
nationalism, where the subalterns are not taken into consideration. I think the Muslims are basically subalterns 
in character devoid of elitist nationalism. „The historiography of Indian nationalism has for a long time been 
dominated by elitism – colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism.‟ (Guha and Spivak 1988: 37). These 
nationalist elites were agents of colonialist elites as the former were deficient in articulating national capital with 
international capital due to lack of fullest development of capitalism. The bourgeois-nationalist elites necessarily 
have had to pursue coercive state action and coercive form of labour control. The disadvantaged groups were 
under the control of the bourgeois-nationalist elites. Partha Chatterjee (1986, 1993) has suggested that anti-
colonial nationalism is „different‟ from the West but „dominated‟ in character. It creates its own domain of 
sovereignty. I think, the bourgeois-nationalist elites tried to imitate the Western material and realized the need to 
preserve the inner spiritual, the Hindu cultural identity.  
…anti-colonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within colonial society well 
before its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social 
institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual. The material domain is 
the domain of the „outside‟, of the economy and of statecraft, of science and technology, a domain 
where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. …The spiritual, on the 
other hand, is an „inner‟ domain bearing the „essential‟ marks of cultural identity. The greater 
one‟s success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to 
preserve the distinctiveness of one‟s spiritual culture. (Chatterjee 1993: 6).  
To Chatterjee, „difference‟ is not a viable criterion in the domain of the material. In essence, difference is a 
function of inclusionary nationalism, which is not in consonance with the exclusionary majoritarian identity or 
nationalism. 
The introduction of adult suffrage and majority rule transferred control of political patronage to Hindu 
hands. Local-level government, which dispenses development funds, is in most places dominated by Hindus, 
while aid is earmarked primarily for lower-caste and tribal people. Today middle and lower-class Muslims find 
themselves increasingly at a disadvantage, since Urdu has ceased to be the language of administration and 
special scholarships and grants to lower-caste Hindus have increased job competition from this quarter. 
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Economic pressures have led many Hyderabad Muslims in recent years to migrate to Middle Eastern countries 
for employment. A sense of relative deprivation did act as the motivating agent in expediting the formation of 
Muslim ethnicity in Southern and Northern India. In reaction to these changes a frustrated Muslim minority has 
continued to emphasize its ethnic distinctiveness. In addition to political lobbying for Muslim interests, Muslims 
have maintained a sense of identity and ethnic distinctiveness in other ways. Language, for example, continues 
to serve an important boundary-defining mechanism. Here, the role of the Muslim elite is important in 
manipulating the symbols of Islam.  
It cannot be denied that Islam and Hinduism constitute wholly different religious systems at the 
elite level. However, it was only through the social mobilization of the Muslim population that 
these differences could be communicated to the mass of Muslims, whose religious practices and 
language did not differ as significantly from the mass of Hindus as did the religious practices and 
language of the elite Muslim groups from the Hindu. (Brass 1974: 178-79).  
The Jamaat-i- Islami, which takes the most militant position on the issue of change in the Personal 
Law, argues that even a ban on polygamy cannot be accepted, because Muslims are sure it will be only the first 
step in the direction of erasing every symbol of a separate Muslim culture in India. The Jamiyat- al-Ulama 
agrees that though its criticism is reinforced by the argument, that any attempt to alter the Personal Law would 
be an infringement of the „covenant‟ of composite nationalism which binds Muslims to India and its Hindu 
countrymen. This was echoed at a convention organised in December 1974, and is repeated at every annual 
session of the Jamiyat. Ziya-ul- Hasan (1983) states the position of the Jamiyat by arguing that the demand for a 
uniform civil code is tantamount to a fundamental departure from the position that in the present day Indian 
situation where the Muslim community is deeply entangled in a struggle for the search and safeguard of its self-
identity, it is only the Personal Law that can be a permanent guarantee for its preservation. The most contentious 
aspect of the Muslim Women Bill, 1986 legislation was the transfer of the concept of maintenance from the 
purview of criminal and civil law to the domain of Personal Law. As a result, Muslim women were removed 
from the social domain and relocated in the domain of the family where personal law would be given primacy 
over their rights as citizens. 
Indian democracy and citizenship is based on religion and culture ignoring secularism and pluralism. It 
is a dangerous possibility on the part of the majoritarian governance. In this regard Zoya Hasan, eminent 
political scientist, CPS, JNU regards that majoritarian democracy in India is targeted at politics of domination in 
terms of culture. It is the explosion of cultural politics. Majoritarian democracy based on religion and culture is 
not politics of equality in terms of diversity and pluralism. Referring to recent comment of Home Minister, 
Rajnath Singh that „secularism‟ is the „most misused‟ (http://indianexpress.com/profile/politician/rajnath-singh) 
word in Indian politics, Hasan states, „It would seem the Home Minister was floating a trial balloon and that 
amending of secularism represents a dominant issue of the government‟s political agenda.‟ (Op.cit, Express 
News Service 2015: 2). In theoretical terms, we know, democracy means government of the people, by the 
people and for the people. I do think it is like government of the majority, by the majority and for the majority. 
Javed Anand (2013) comments that the Indian democracy is not an exceptional case out of other 
majoritarianisms. The fact is that the Indian democracy is dwindled with majoritarianism or majoritarian rule, 
irrespective of the parties in power.  
For proof, read the report of the high-powered Sachar Committee for abundant evidence of 
institutionalised discrimination against the country‟s Muslims. At its worst, there is state-
complicit, even state-sponsored, mob terror unleashed on India‟s religious minorities. The most 
gruesome examples of these are the targeting of Muslims (Nellie, 1983; Bhagalpur, 1989 
Bombay, 1992-93; Gujarat, 1992 and 2002), Sikhs (Delhi, 1984), Kashmiri Pandits (J & K, 1989), 
Christians (Kandhamal, 2008). (Anand, 2013: 1).  
I do agree with Ashutosh Varshney‟s comments on India‟s nascent democracy (Varshney 2012, 
2013).There is institutionalized discrimination in Indian democracy.  
Having accepted the findings of the Sachar Committee and the pledge to implement its 
recommendations, the opinion government has made a miserly start through a scheme of 
scholarships to students from minority communities. The scheme is being implemented across the 
country for the last few years. The Modi government, however, doggedly refuses to implement it, 
claiming it amounts to “minority appeasement”.  Division bench of Gujarat High Court ruled that 
a “scheme for affirmative action” is not unconstitutional. (Anand 2013: 2).  
The vision is clear. The Modi government is discriminatory towards the minorities. Due to this 
discrimination, the Muslims in India are now in resistance. Mushirul Hasan (1988) says about the „systematic 
neglect‟ of the Muslims in India. To him,  
What has angered Muslims is not so much the fact that state patronage of religious fervour has 
encouraged the fringe of Hindu extremism, but that a systematic neglect of their interests has 
contributed to their economic decline. The view that the economic weakness of the Muslims must 
be seen in the context of the total society where development is slow, wages are low and 
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unemployment on the rise carries no conviction with most Muslim activist groups who argue that 
opportunities of economic advancement are specially blocked for their community which has 
borne the consequences of official neglect and discrimination. In the case of scheduled castes and 
tribes there are compensatory programmes; there are none for the Muslims. Yet other categories in 
north India, such as the Kurmis, Yadavs and Gujars, have been economically weak and have not 
had access to compensatory programmes. But, then, they have in some measure sought to 
neutralise their weakness through mobilisation in the political domain, using their numbers and 
voting strength to secure attention. To be sure, such mobilisation, when it seeks politically 
allocated resources by way of job quotas, etc. have generated violent contentiousness in Bihar and 
elsewhere; but the magnitude of this contentiousness is small compared to the consequences that 
await Muslims when they seek to assert themselves, politically or otherwise. (Hasan 1988: 2470). 
 Again,  
Nevertheless, whatever be the case, Muslim communalism is very different from the militant 
Hindu right wing. Unlike Hindutva as manifested in different organisations which together go as 
Sangh Parivar, Muslim communalism neither has a single, all-India ideology nor a single, 
monolithic organisation guided and led by something like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS). It is not only region specific but scattered and without any identifiable foundations. It is 
based, on the one hand, on resentments, grievances and apprehension and, on the other, on vague 
aspirations and hopes of getting a better deal from the government. (Alam 2008: 47).  
Ever since India‟s independence from Britain in 1947 and the tragic death toll resulting partition 
creating Pakistan, the sub-continent has been marked by religious conflict. Over the last twenty years, this has 
taken especially bloody turns.‟ There is a contradiction and conflict between, „one between democratic 
“citizens” and communal “people”, and the other between the dynamics of hegemonic “majoritarianism” and the 
consequences of minority “marginalization”. The relationship between the two is explored with special 
reference to Hindu-Sikh violence generally in the state of Punjab and the long standing Hindu-Muslim violence 
generally initiated and sustained by Shib Sena and other movements of the Hindutva cause, as occurred most 
recently in the state of Gujarat in 2002. India offers a cautionary tale in which both democracy and religious 
freedom hang in the balance. (Gupta 2007: 27). 
Indian nation-state has adopted Western parliamentary set up with liberal-democratic character. The 
nation-state is defined in terms of territorial political community of citizens. Nation-building process in India is 
associated with state-sponsored and state-directed process of economic development and social transformation. 
Islam (2012) citing Hasan (2002) has identified „neoliberal dispensation‟ in India as marker of „contemporary 
India‟, can be clearly distinguishable from the pre-neoliberal phase of history and politics. In a post-colonial 
period, the major politico-ideological currents that precedes the making of contemporary neoliberal India are 
Nehruvian model of State-capitalism, secularism and the Congress system in 1950s and 1960s and the 
fragmentation of the Congress system with a transition to regionalism from late 1960s till mid-1980s and 
subsequently the rise of Mandir, Mandal and Market from late 1980s onwards: symbolically expressing the 
politics of majoritarian communalism, the politics backward and lower castes and the policies of neoliberal 
economic reforms (Islam 2012). 
The concept of nation building has been challenged in India. „Infused with a strong missionary zeal of 
unitary nationalism Hindutva seeks to legitimize majority communalism in the name of nationalism. Such an 
ideology of nationalism, i.e. majority-ethnicism, cannot serve as the basis for the functioning of a modern state 
in India – a multiethnic society.‟ (Seth 1999: 35). Omar Khalidi (1993) quotes Sardar Patel (1969):  
There is no place here for those who claim separate representation. I want the consent of this 
house and the consent of all the minorities to change the course of history. For a community to 
think that its interests are different from that of the country in which it lives is a great mistake. 
Assuming that we agreed today to the reservation of seats, I would consider myself to be the 
greatest enemy of the Muslim community, because of the con- sequences of that step in a secular 
and democratic state: Assume that you have separate electorates on a communal basis. Will you 
ever find a place in any of the ministries in the provinces or in the centre? You have a separate 
interest. Here is a ministry or a government based on joint responsibility, where people who do 
not trust us or who do not trust the majority cannot obviously come into the government itself. 
You will exclude yourself and remain perpetually in a minority. Then, what advantage will you 
gain? You perhaps think that there will be some third power who will use its influence to put the 
minority against the majority and compel the majority to take one or two ministers according to 
the proportion of the population. It is a wrong idea. That conception in your mind which has 
worked for many years must be washed off altogether. For the future of a minority it is best to 
trust the majority. If the majority misbehaves, it will suffer. If I were a member of a minority 
community, I would forget that I belong to a minority community. Why should not a member of 
any community be the prime minister of this country? Trust us and see what hap- pens. Why are 
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you afraid? Make friends with others and create change in the atmosphere. You will then get more 
than your quota, if you really feel for the country in the same manner as other people. Now I do 
not think, so far as the Muslim case is concerned, there is any other point remaining to be 
answered. (Sardar Patel 1969: n.f.). 
In India, we find a contradiction between civil society and political national society and minority rights 
in terms of citizenship rights, are insufficient to protect cultural identity of the minority communities. Ernesto 
Laclau (2008) in a recent interview has argued that there are „no obvious forms of universality which can 
replace the notion of identity.‟ Laclau finds that  
Any social identity would necessarily entail, as one of its dimensions, construction, and not 
simply recognition. The key term for understanding this process of construction is the 
psychoanalytic category of identification, with its explicit assertion of a lack at the root of any 
identity: one needs to identify with something because there is an originary and insurmountable 
lack of identity. (Laclau 1994: 3). 
In liberal democracy fairness demands more than state neutrality and considerations of justice, 
freedom, citizenship and equality demand differences of cultural identities, cultural and group rights, 
multiculturalism, the claims of diversity, politics of difference and recognition. Public institutions should 
recognize cultural and disadvantaged minorities. „This requirement of political recognition of cultural 
particularity – extended to all individuals – is compatible with form of universalism…‟ (Gutmann 1994: 3). 
Culture is marked with marginalization and politics of redress of grievances. Multicultural perspective is 
concerned with justice, fairness and citizenship. Constitution is a „form of accommodation of cultural diversity‟ 
and „an intercultural dialogue in which the culturally diverse sovereign citizens of contemporary societies 
negotiate agreements.‟ (Tully 1995: 30). It is essential to justify multiplicity of culturally diverse voices. 
Wittgenstein‟s idea of language game, Michel Foucault‟s genealogy and governmentality, and Hanna Arendt‟s 
concept of freedom and active citizenship are sources of multicultural tradition. Politics of cultural recognition 
means gathering the broad and various political activities which jointly call cultural diversity into question as 
constitutional problem. „A constitution can seek to impose one cultural practice, one way of rule following, or it 
can recognize a diversity of cultural ways of being a citizen, but it cannot eliminate, overcome or transcend this 
cultural dimension of politics.‟ (Tully 1995: 6). In fact, cultures are overlapping, interactive and internally 
negotiated. Culture is the universal and commanding natural language of difference. All the differences are 
fundamentally relative.  
… one of the basic values of our culture is that it and its basic values are relative, i.e. that it is one 
culture among many essentially unrelated cultures… knows that it is relative, … it locates its own 
superiority in this knowledge of its relativity, as it likewise locates inferiority in ignorance of this 
relativity.‟ (McGrane 1989: 120).  
Taylor (1992) finds that politics of equal recognition is important and fundamentally human life is 
dialogical and interactive. As human agents we define our identity. We are interacting with significant others. 
Human identity rests on autonomy, on the ability of each person to determine the good of life. In „politics of 
equal identity, what is established is meant to be universally the same, an identical basket of rights and 
immunities… forms of non-discrimination that is quite “blind” to the ways in which citizens differ.‟ (Taylor 
1992: 38-39). 
Diverse social groups can find an important place by negotiating and balancing overlapping 
conceptions for competing membership claims without sacrificing various group identities. In India ethno-
nationalist citizenship discourse gained currency after partition. Indian constitution established a common 
citizenship based on individual rights and collectivist notion of citizenship and common good. In 1950s and 
1960s Government failed to provide equal citizenship to the Muslims. There is a liberal dilemma in the role of 
the state with respect to religious community – „If the government defers to the wishes of the religious group, a 
vulnerable groups of individuals will lose basic rights; if the government commits itself to respecting the equal 
human rights of all individuals, it will stand accused of indifference to the liberty of conscience.‟ (Nussbaum 
1999: 84). By the mid-1970s the republican conception of citizenship was called into question by non-statist 
citizenship discourse. During the emergency period an attempt was made by the Indira Gandhi government to 
restore republican discourse of citizenship by achieving socio-economic revolution, reducing poverty and 
ignorance. During this period a fundamental shift began to take place – growing prominence of ethno-nationalist 
and liberal citizenship discourses were balanced against each other. However, the process of economic 
liberalization from the 1980s provided the liberal citizenship discourse. Hindu nationalist discourse began 
popularity in response to ethno-nationalist discourse of citizenship. In India the minority incorporates not only 
the Muslims, but also the Christians, SCs, STs and OBCs etc. Therefore, the Muslim citizenship in terms of 
„majority-minority‟ question cannot be constructed.  
Caste, tribal, linguistic as well as religious groups can be self-defined minorities for any one of a 
number of reasons: they have a distinctive group identity that they fear is eroding; they regard 
themselves as socially and economically subordinate to others; or they believe that they suffer 
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from discrimination, either from others in the society or from the state itself… To declare one‟s 
group a minority is, therefore, a political act. In the Indian context, it is a way of calling attention 
to a situation of self-defined deprivation… The term „minority‟ has come to be reserved for those 
who are “disadvantaged”. (Weiner 1989: 42-43).  
Furthermore, the Indian state and polity are not interested to encroach upon the private sphere of the religious 
minority communities, for example the Shah Bano controversy case, where the Muslim orthodox section 
resented their voices against the encroachment of their private sphere. A graphical representation may be 
sketched below (Fig. 1): 
 
Gender equality in Shah Bano case was subordinated to religious claims and religious membership and 
gender equality came into conflicts with religious claims of a minority group. In Danial Latifi case the Supreme 
Court in its judgment recognized the diversity of traditions. In Shah Bano and Danial Latifi cases the Supreme 
Court attempted to ensure equal respect and treatment for Muslim women, regardless of religious membership 
and diversity of traditions. The question is to resolve the conflict between gender equality and religious cultural 
claims, to reforming the religious-cultural traditions. Deliberative democracy based on multiculturalism so to 
say can reconcile the conflict between gender equality and religious cultural claims. Cross-cultural dialogue is 
essential in this respect. It is the alternative ways of negotiating with conflicting claims. Cultural conflicts are 
rooted in a cosmopolitan point of view, from which negotiation of difference is both pragmatic and moral 
imperative. In this resolution of conflicts Benhabib (1992, 1995 and 2002) relies on dialectical process of 
reasoning and universal and necessary presuppositions of communicative speech. Within the limits of 
reasonable pluralism conflicting cultural claims can be negotiated and resolved. Benhabib (1992) makes a 
multicultural arrangement. Three key principles are necessary for this multicultural arrangement – egalitarian 
reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription and freedom of exist and association. For a just multicultural arrangement 
the freedom to exist and to disassociate from the group must be unrestricted, which communitarians like Bikhu 
Parekh does not believe and specify culture as a matter of non-preference and cultural membership as 
mandatory. Critics find that Benhabib does not find the role of culture put forwarded by communitarian 
multiculturalists. Kymlika puts forward his conception of multicultural citizenship based on respect-based 
liberalism. Benhabib‟s model of deliberative democracy and unrestricted freedom to exist and to disassociate 
may challenge the cultural “ways of life” of different cultural groups and cultural membership. Benhabib‟s 
voluntary self-ascription recognizes individual self-ascription and determination with group membership. She 
goes beyond mere legal regulation of conflicting cultural claims of communitarian multiculturalism and 
democratic equality. A combination of legal regulation and constitutional enforcement with expanded cross-
cultural moral-political dialogue allows sub-altern and subordinated voices within religious minority groups to 
be expressed and given proper weightage. Benhabib‟s approach is different from Shachar‟s „joint governance‟ 
model recognizes the importance of legal regulation.  
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The strategies adopted by the Indian Supreme Court provide us with valuable lessons on the 
cultural mediation of human rights norms… the Supreme Court chose to listen to subaltern 
voices,… Those voices, though often appealing to background cultural justifications to support 
their claims, accepted Muslim women‟s right to be treated as equal citizens. A commitment to the 
constitutional essential of equality was the starting point for the Supreme Court‟s judgement in the 
Latifi case. In the Shah Bano case, it was the generally applicable law, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure and the societal obligation to ensure that Muslim women were not vulnerable to 
destitution and poverty as a result of a discriminatory application of the law. In both of these 
cases, we see an attempt to combine legal regulation with an expanded moral-political dialogue on 
the meaning and scope of constitutional essentials and religion-based personal laws. (Mullally 
2004: 689).  
Here, the Constitutional essentials may be cited below: 
We are a secular and democratic state with a written Constitution having values enshrined quoted 
from the Preamble such as “Justice, social, economic and political; Liberty of thought, expression, 
belief, faith and worship; Equality of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all, 
Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation” which 
guides all our laws and actions. We also have Article 44 of the Constitution which states that “The 
State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of 
India”. The word used is “uniform civil code” and not “common civil code” as being popularly 
quoted, and the difference in implied meaning should not be ignored. The word uniform, I would 
argue, implies retaining the diversity in detail but ensuring uniformity in base values. All 
communities have their own customary diversities, which should be retained, but we need to 
provide a uniform base of constitutional values - this is the most plausible interpretation of this 
clause. (Patel 2009: 49). 
Rural Muslims are generally agriculturists or engaged in their traditional crafts and they are relatively 
conservative in social life. But urban Muslims, who have come in contact with the modern education system, 
have adopted modern occupations and have even entered the governmental jobs and professions. Such Muslims 
have become more urbanised in their life-style. Even in urban areas, there are different types of Muslims, some 
still engaged in petty business and mechanical work and others who have acquired immense wealth and manage 
large business establishments. Naturally, such differentiation affects and is reflected in the voting behaviour of 
the Muslims (Participant Observant as a member of the same Community, Life Long experience). The political 
parties are trying to harbour benefits from the destitutions of the Muslim minorities. Here, my opinion is that if 
politics is about the questions of multiple interests, conflict of interests and resolution of conflict, then politics in 
India excludes ethics and morality. Religion-based politics in India has become more important to-day in total 
humiliation of secular politics. Bharatiya Janata Party‟s „Hindutva‟ or Hindu Nationalist Orientation is well 
known and more easily comprehendible in its stand on Babri Masjid-Ram Janma Bhumi dispute, Masjid 
demolition, Uniform Civil Code, Special Provisions for Jammu and Kashmir, RSS, VHP and Shiv Sena‟s 
communal upsurge, and finally exclusion Masjid premises from agenda of Swach Bharat Avijan (Transparent 
India Journey). Prime Minister Modi‟s statement excludes the term „Masjid‟, but specifically includes the term 
„Mandir‟. How Swach Bharat Avijan can be fruitful without Muslims in Masjids (Mosques)? On the issue of 
forced religious transformation, where few Muslims were forced to take part in Hindu religious practices, the 
Modi government did not take any positive steps to assure the Muslim community that India is a secular 
democratic country. During the reign of Narendra Modi, we cannot forget the Godhara massacre in Gujarat few 
days back. It is a serious humiliation of Muslim Minority status. Mention here may be made that the bulk of the 
Muslim population in the towns (of Bihar) resides in slums, mostly employed as rickshaw-pullers, bidi-makers, 
tailors, petty artisans, and small shop-keepers. Clearly, Muslims are not as disadvantaged as Dalits, but they are 
far below Hindus (including SCs) in these four basic indicators (Table 1). Excluding Dalits, Caste Hindus are to 
be considered in comparison with the Muslims (Habib, 2006: 82-83). 
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As far as health is concerned, a large portion of the community is underfed and ill-nourished. 
Tuberculosis, anaemia, different types of eye diseases, low blood-pressure and the like are the common diseases 
from which their masses suffer, and in such diseases their percentage is high, some-times higher than of any 
other community. The Muslims are ill represented in all spheres of decision-making. The role of Islam in 
politics is important, which is the essence of community, but not of difference. But, the recognition of difference 
cannot be ignored. It is the recognition of a particular community. The role of Islam as a religion is not 
derogatory at all. According to Gramsci, the three elements  Religion (or „active‟ conception of the world), 
State, and Party  are indissoluble, and in the real process of historico-political development there is a necessary 
passage from one to the other.  
The Muslims cannot divorce their religion from their politics. In Islam, religious and political 
beliefs are not separated from each other. Religion and politics are inseparably associated in the 
minds and thoughts of all Muslims. Their religion includes their politics and their politics are a 
part of their religion. The mosque not only constitutes a place of their worship but also the 
Assembly Hall. They are born into a system. The system is not thrust on them. Religion and 
politics are the same to them. Hence, Hindu-Muslim unity or nationalism, signifying homogeneity 
between them in all non-religious matters, is unimaginable. The Islamic polity in which religion 
and politics are inseparably united requires perfect isolation for its development. The idea of a 
common state with heterogeneous membership is alien to Islam and can never be fruitful. (Shakir 
1979: 471). 
Following Althusserian concept of the practical role of ideology we can say that secularism as an 
ideology helps the elites and counter-elites of the nation state to legitimize their role and to claim for monopoly 
on religious tolerance and political rationality. Here, religion is treated as an ideology with pre-occupations with 
non-religious matters, usually political and economic interests. When religion is treated as an ideology, then it is 
not surprising to point out that the BJP‟s Hindu nationalist orientation within the Indian secular political 
structure is an essential outbreak of this treatment. But, the treatment of religion as faith is a way of life 
promoting pluralism and tolerance, essentially suited to Indian multicultural secular political structure. Recent 
politics of secularism in India is a part of the process of formation of majoritarian modern state practices; 
promote religion as an ideology (Nandy 1990). Nandy (1990) states that we should not rely on secularism of 
majoritarian modernized elite, i.e., religion as an ideology, rather we should rely on religion as faith that should 
explore the philosophy, the symbolism and the theology of tolerance. In religion as an ideology, religion is an 
instrument of the political project of „Hindutva‟ through war of position.  
The discourse of communalism criticizes other religions for being monolithic, but aspires to build 
a monolithic unity. It glorifies diversity within Hinduism as a mark of its superiority over Semitic 
religions, but seeks to repress this diversity. It identifies aggressiveness as an evil intrinsic to other 
religions, but attempts to instil the same quality in all Hindus. It talks of patience and tolerance as 
innate virtues of Hindus, yet sees these traits as the basis of Hindu weakness. It condemns other 
religions for their politics of religious repression and temple destruction, but organizes itself 
around the same politics… it demeans both religion and „tradition‟. (Bhattacharya 1991: 131).  
The majoritarian, unitary and monolithic conception of Indian nationalism has served as the official 
ideology of post-colonial Indian nationalism (Chatterjee 1986). Mention here may be made that the state-
building and national reconstruction enterprise in India took place following the line transfer of power or in 
Gramscian sense through „passive revolution‟. The „Hindutva‟ campaign of BJP, VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal is 
in the „war of position‟ with the elements of „war of movement‟. The relation between „crisis of hegemony‟ of 
the Congress party and the rise of BJP is a strong point in favour of the homogenising ideology of „Hindutva‟. 
„…the content the crisis of…hegemony…a „crisis of authority‟ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of 
hegemony, or the crisis of the state as a whole.‟ (Gramsci 1988: 217-19). The „Hindutva‟ ideology is like the 
Gramscian „passive revolution‟. It (Hindutva project) has some corollary with Gramscian fascist Italy.  
…fascism merely modifies the program of conservation and reaction which has always dominated 
Italian politics, through a different way of conceiving the unification of the reactionary forces. It 
replaces the tactic of agreements and compromises by the project of achieving the organic unity of 
all the [reactionary] forces in a single political organism under the control of a single 
centre…fascism…fitted into the framework of traditional Italian [state] policies…it was therefore 
favoured…by…the old ruling groups…socially…fascism found its base in the urban petty-
bourgeoisie and in a new rural bourgeoisie…[but] this project…also allowed fascism to win the 
support of the most decisively reactionary part of the industrial bourgeoisie and of the 
landowners. (Forgacs 1988: 147-48). 
The liberal democracy cannot be neutral. This inevitable non-neutrality should be directed, explicitly and 
exclusively, against principles and practices at odds with liberal democracy, against fundamentalism of all 
kinds, not against religions as such. In their defence of the principle of reciprocity against the fundamentalist 
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(religious) challenge that it is „biased against fundamentalism, and in favour of religions that conform to 
deliberative views of civic education,‟ Gutmann and Thompson concede that it is correct 
… that the principle is not neutral among religions or ways of life. The case for reciprocity, and 
more generally for the deliberative perspective, must be defended on substantive moral grounds, 
and there is no reason to expect that such a defense would have the same (positive or negative) 
implications for all moral positions. But the value of public reason expressed by the deliberative 
perspective is not just another morality. It is offered as the morally optimal basis on which 
citizens who disagree about moralities and religions can act collectively to make educational 
policy. The principle of reciprocity is not privileged in the sense that it needs no moral defense. 
But the defense it needs and the objections to which it is vulnerable are different from those of 
moral disagreement in politics. The principle proposes a basis on which those who morally 
disagree can cooperate, and it can be appropriately criticized only by proposing an alternative 
basis, not simply by reaffirming the moral or religious claim that constitutes the disagreement. 
The fundamentalists do not offer an alternative. (Gutmann and Thompson 1996: 67; cf. 93: 
“second-order agreement” not on secularism but on principles and virtues of liberal democracy) 
A promising alternative to a majoritarian system may be „consociational‟ democracy. This model, as 
political scientist Arend Lijphart describes it, has four major components. First and most important is 
„government by a grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society‟. 
Second is the mutual veto, which serves as an „additional protection of vital minority interests‟. Third is 
„proportionality as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of 
public funds.‟ And fourth is a „high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own affairs‟. A similar 
approach is suggested by a scholar familiar with the Lebanese politics, which ensures representation to all the 
components of ethno-linguistic or religiously divided or diverse societies. (Dekmejian 1978: 252-65) 
Pluralism is an idea by which the diversity underlies the nationhood. Citizenship is a key institution by 
means of which competing demands for membership are made, an engagement between individuals, social 
groups and the state, and a method through which nationhood is achieved. Among the three citizenship 
approaches of liberal, republican and ethno-nationalist, I do prefer the last one, where the liberals argue for 
individuals as units and bearers of individual rights, republicans for common good and community as unit and 
ethno-nationalists for citizenship membership by descent group that defines the nation. Gandhian notion of non-
statist citizenship transcends ethno-nationalist citizenship – there is no majority victory over minority, all must 
deliberate together until unanimity is achieved. It may be mentioned here that economic liberalization has 
enhanced liberal citizenship discourse. The new liberal agenda in India, particularly the economic aspect of 
liberalization is partly a significant departure from Nehruvian model of social democracy and a continuation of 
modernizing goals through capitalist and liberal-democratic institutions. Despite the approach to „good 
governance‟, deregulation, privatization and marketization have brought about changes in the notions of 
democracy, justice and welfare – these would remove decisions from the political arena and reduce political 
pressures on the state. However, the state would attempt to combine market efficiency with state welfarism. The 
nature of the welfare state in India facing necessarily two challenges – market demands and minimum state 
requirements and challenge from group members and demand for interventionist state. It may be mentioned here 
that the „politics of “collective personalities” – such as cohesive religious communities in search of identity or 
constellations or disadvantaged groups seeking empowerment – deny individuals what they claim for 
themselves and render the vocabulary of rights ineffectual, because it is individual-centered. The state, in turn, 
has failed in terms of its intolerance of class-based agitations, and its relative responsiveness to the demands of 
ethnic communities. It has also, in its withdrawal from welfare functions, rendered citizens vulnerable, and 
forced them to resort to support structures of kith and kin for material and emotional sustenance. (Mahajan, Pai 
and Jayal 1994: 116). In modern India politics of cultural difference has been of pre-eminent value. The 
question of Indian unity has never been settled beyond all differences and disputations. We have no culturally 
homogeneous, dominant and majority ethnic and religious group that could both dominate as well as effectively 
claim to represent all Indians. However, the Hindu extremist party, like BJP is trying to develop one 
homogeneous nation-state denying the heterogeneity. „… the concept of multiculturalism can prove to be an 
effective counter to the homogenizing project of hindutva and there exists, on account of this very reason, a 
strong case for its promotion and encouragement in this country.‟ (Ali 2000: 2503).  
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